Contemporary health care often lacks generosity of spirit, even when treatment is most efficient. Too many patients are left unhappy with how they are treated, and too many medical professionals feel estranged from the calling that drew them to medicine. Arthur W. Frank tells the stories of ill people, doctors, and nurses who are restoring generosity to medicine--generosity toward others and to themselves. The Renewal of Generosity evokes medicine as the face-to-face encounter that comes before and after diagnostics, pharmaceuticals, (...) and surgeries. Frank calls upon the Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius, philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, and literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin to reflect on stories of ill people, doctors, and nurses who transform demoralized medicine into caring relationships. He presents their stories as a source of consolation for both ill and professional alike and as an impetus to changing medical systems. Frank shows how generosity is being renewed through dialogue that is more than the exchange of information. Dialogue is an ethic and an ideal for people on both sides of the medical encounter who want to offer more to those they meet and who want their own lives enriched in the process. The Renewal of Generosity views illness and medical work with grace and compassion, making an invaluable contribution to expanding our vision of suffering and healing. (shrink)

Action explanations like ‘I am heading to the ferry because the bridge is closed,’ are supposed to require restatement: ‘I am... because I believe the bridge is closed,’ because (i) the objective claim may be false though the intended explanation is correct, and (ii) because objective circumstances have to be cognitively mediated if they are to bear on action. This supposition is rejected here. Restatements cannot withdraw the objective claim without withdrawing the explanation. In the context of reason‐giving, belief statements (...) do not function as assertions about the inner life. The fact that belief statements may be true though the belief itself is false creates the illusion of distinctive subject matters. The illusion is exploited by conceptions of belief positing stored representations. Even if there were such representations, retrieved for the sake of expressing previously acquired beliefs, the expression of belief must endorse p and cannot merely advert to the existence and content of a representation. The reverse of the standard philosophical view about restatement is actually correct. Wherever an agent correctly adduces a belief that an objective circumstance obtains in explaining his action, a de‐psychologizing restatement that merely makes the objective claim must be ascribable to the agent. (shrink)

In this paper, we show that certain choiceless models of ZF originally constructed using an almost huge cardinal can be constructed using cardinals strictly weaker in consistency strength.

In At the Will of the Body , Arthur Frank told the story of his own illnesses, heart attack and cancer. That book ended by describing the existence of a "remission society," whose members all live with some form of illness or disability. The Wounded Storyteller is their collective portrait. Ill people are more than victims of disease or patients of medicine they are wounded storytellers. People tell stories to make sense of their suffering when they turn their diseases (...) into stories, they find healing. Drawing on the work of authors such as Oliver Sacks, Anatole Broyard, Norman Cousins, and Audre Lorde, as well as from people he met during the years he spent among different illness groups, Frank recounts a stirring collection of illness stories, ranging from the well-known--Gilda Radner's battle with ovarian cancer--to the private testimonials of people with cancer, chronic fatigue syndrome, and disabilties. Their stories are more than accounts of personal suffering: they abound with moral choices and point to a social ethic. Frank identifies three basic narratives of illness in restitution, chaos, and quest. Restitution narratives anticipate getting well again and give prominence to the technology of cure. In chaos narratives, illness seems to stretch on forever, with no respite or redeeming insights. Quest narratives are about finding that insight as illness is transformed into a means for the ill person to become someone new. (shrink)

One task of logic, Peirce held, is to classify arguments so as to determine the validity of each kind. His own classification is interesting because it includes a novel type of argument in addition to the two traditionally recognized types. It is the purpose of this paper to discuss what Peirce thought to be sufficiently distinctive about abduction to warrant calling it a new kind of argument. But since one finds in his writings on abduction a number of different views (...) it is first necessary to make a few remarks concerning the unity of Peirce's thought. (shrink)

We obtain an equiconsistency for a weak form of universal indestructibility for strongness. The equiconsistency is relative to a cardinal weaker in consistency strength than a Woodin cardinal. Stewart Baldwin's notion of hyperstrong cardinal. We also briefly indicate how our methods are applicable to universal indestructibility for supercompactness and strong compactness.

We force and construct a model in which level by level equivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness holds, along with certain additional combinatorial properties. In particular, in this model, ♦ δ holds for every regular uncountable cardinal δ, and below the least supercompact cardinal κ, □ δ holds on a stationary subset of κ. There are no restrictions in our model on the structure of the class of supercompact cardinals.

It is known that if $\kappa < \lambda$ are such that κ is indestructibly supercompact and λ is 2λ supercompact, then level by level equivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness fails. We prove a theorem which points towards this result being best possible. Specifically, we show that relative to the existence of a supercompact cardinal, there is a model for level by level equivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness containing a supercompact cardinal κ in which κ’s strong compactness is indestructible (...) under κ-directed closed forcing. (shrink)

We develop a new method for coding sets while preserving GCH in the presence of large cardinals, particularly supercompact cardinals. We will use the number of normal measures carried by a measurable cardinal as an oracle, and therefore, in order to code a subset A of κ, we require that our model contain κ many measurable cardinals above κ. Additionally we will describe some of the applications of this result. © 2011 WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim.

We construct models containing exactly one supercompact cardinal in which level by level inequivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness holds. In each model, above the supercompact cardinal, there are finitely many strongly compact cardinals, and the strongly compact and measurable cardinals precisely coincide.

Starting from cardinals κ κ is measurable, we construct a model for the theory “ZF + n < ω[DCn] + ω + 1 is a measurable cardinal”. This is the maximum amount of dependent choice consistent with the measurability of ω + 1, and by a theorem of Shelah using p.c.f. theory, is the best result of this sort possible.

If bioethics seeks to affect what people do and don't do as they respond to the practical issues that confront them, then it is useful to take seriously people's sense of rightness. Rightness emerges from the fabric of a life—including the economy of its geography, the events of its times, its popular culture—to be what the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu calls a predisposition. It is the product of a way of life and presupposes continuing to live that way. Rightness is local (...) and communal, holding in relationship those who share the same predisposing sense of how to experience. Rightness is an embodied way of evaluating what is known to matter and choosing among possible responses. Bioethics spends considerable time on what people should do and on the arguments that support recommended actions. It might spend more time on what shapes people's sense of the rightness of what they feel called to do. (shrink)

The issue of boundaries in clinician–patientencounters is considered through narrativeanalysis of four clinical stories in whichboundaries crossings are a self-conscioustopic. One story is by a physician as patient,two are by physicians, and one is by apalliative care nurse. The stories arediscussed using Walter Benjamin''s distinctionbetween the painter, who maintains distance andsees the whole, and the cameraman, who usestechnology to penetrate realities and thenreassembles fragments. The essay argues thatdistance and closeness are ethical issues thatconstitute the possibility of clinicalencounters but the encounter (...) also changes theclinician''s sense of boundaries. The relevantethics of boundary decisions in most clinicalencounters are not procedural ethics but anethics of self-creation: in orienting toboundaries as doctors do, they createthemselves in their relations to others. (shrink)

The narrative ethicist imagines life as multiple points of view, each reflecting a distinct imagination and each more or less capable of comprehending other points of view and how they imagine. Each point of view is constantly being acted out and then modified in response to how others respond. People generally have good intentions, but they get stuck realizing those intentions. Stories stall when dialogue breaks down. People stop hearing others' stories, maybe because those others have quit telling their stories. (...) The narrative ethicist's job is to help people generate new imaginations that can restart dialogues. (shrink)

This review of Jay Baruch's Tornado of Life: A Doctor's Journey through Constraints and Creativity in the ER considers the book's contributions, including its explorations of the clinical dilemma of working with patients’ stories that are fragmented, how easily clinicians can miss crucial parts of patients’ stories and how that affects care, and the “agonizing compromises” between what patients need and what institutions can provide. Baruch acknowledges, without any self‐indulgence, the shame that his work causes him, given the limitations of (...) what he can do. (shrink)

Because statements like ‘This object is soluble in aqua regia’ involve the causal modalities, we call them causal dispositional statements. Now while this involvement has long been recognized, no thorough examination of its exact nature has ever been made. One purpose of this paper is to begin such an examination. In Sec. 2 we will suggest an analysis of causal dispositional statements, and in Sec. 3 we will discuss some philosophic issues to which this analysis is relevant.

1. Introduction. It is generally admitted that a large part of man's knowledge is based on inductive arguments. Hence any philosophical theory concerning the nature of inductive arguments constitutes an epistemological theory. Any such philosophical theory of induction must, if it is to be satisfactory, take adequate account of Hume's criticism of inductive arguments. One way of treating his criticism is to say that the validity of inductive arguments is in an important sense relative to some broad factual assumptions about (...) the general nature of the universe and that these general factual assumptions are presupposed in a certain way by the users of inductive arguments. Let us call any theory of this general type a postulate theory of induction. (shrink)

If κ < λ are such that κ is a strong cardinal whose strongness is indestructible under κ -strategically closed forcing and λ is weakly compact, then we show thatA = {δ < κ | δ is a non-weakly compact Mahlo cardinal which reflects stationary sets}must be unbounded in κ. This phenomenon, however, need not occur in a universe with relatively few large cardinals. In particular, we show how to construct a model where no cardinal is supercompact up to a (...) Mahlo cardinal in which the least supercompact cardinal κ is also the least strongly compact cardinal, κ 's strongness is indestructible under κ -strategically closed forcing, κ 's supercompactness is indestructible under κ -directed closed forcing not adding any new subsets of κ, and δ is Mahlo and reflects stationary sets iff δ is weakly compact. In this model, no strong cardinal δ < κ is indestructible under δ -strategically closed forcing. It therefore follows that it is relatively consistent for the least strong cardinal κ whose strongness is indestructible under κ -strategically closed forcing to be the same as the least supercompact cardinal, which also has its supercompactness indestructible under κ -directed closed forcing not adding any new subsets of κ. (shrink)

Starting from a model “κ is supercompact” + “No cardinal is supercompact up to a measurable cardinal”, we force and construct a model such that “κ is supercompact” + “No cardinal is supercompact up to a measurable cardinal” + “δ is measurable iff δ is tall” in which level by level equivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness holds. This extends and generalizes both [, Theorem 1] and the results of.

We examine the number of normal measures a successor cardinal can carry, in universes in which the Axiom of Choice is false. When considering successors of singular cardinals, we establish relative consistency results assuming instances of supercompactness, together with the Ultrapower Axiom (introduced by Goldberg in [12]). When considering successors of regular cardinals, we establish relative consistency results only assuming the existence of one measurable cardinal. This allows for equiconsistencies.

A question of Foreman and Magidor asks if it is consistent for every sequence of stationary subsets of the ℵ n ’s for 1≤n<ω to be mutually stationary. We get a positive answer to this question in the context of the negation of the Axiom of Choice. We also indicate how a positive answer to a generalized version of this question in a choiceless context may be obtained.

We distinguish scanning switches, which only enumerate states, from function switches which transform input states into output states. For the latter we introduce a logical network symbolism. Our history of early computer switching begins with the suggestions of Ramon Lull and Gottfried Leibniz, surveys the evolution of mechanical scanning switches and the first mechanical function switches, and then describes the first electromechanical function switches. The main themes of the present paper are that William S. Jevons built the first substantial function (...) switch (his logical piano), and that his work led to the design by Allan Marquand of the first substantial electromechanical function switch, as well as to Charles S. Peirce's idea for an electrical general-purpose programmable computer. These events all occurred fifty years before the first general-purpose programmable computers were constructed (in the 1940's), but they had no influence. (shrink)

Narrative ethics holds that if you ask someone what goodness is, as a basis of action, most people will first appeal to various abstractions, each of which can be defined only by other abstractions that in turn require further definition. If you persist in asking what each of these abstractions actually means, eventually that person will have to tell you a story and expect you to recognize goodness in the story. Goodness and badness need stories to make them thinkable and (...) to translate them into individual and collective actions. Yet after more than two decades of considering the issue, I do not believe that a collection of stories can by itself guide actions in ways that are sufficient to respond to ethical troubles in institutional settings. The question will always remain open for me, but my present belief is that narrative bioethics is always hyphenated, in the sense that guidance from stories needs to be allied with other ethical guidance. Each side of the hyphen qualifies the other side. The hyphenation I will argue for in this essay is “narrative-deontology.”. (shrink)

"More than any thing else technology creates our world. It creates our wealth, our economy, our very way of being," says W. Brian Arthur. Yet, until now the major questions of technology have gone unanswered. Where do new technologies come from -- how exactly does invention work? What constitutes innovation, and how is it achieved? Why are certain regions -- Cambridge, England, in the 1920s and Silicon Valley today -- hotbeds of innovation, while others languish? Does technology, like biological (...) life, evolve? How do new industries, and the economy itself, emerge from technologies? In this groundbreaking work, pioneering technology thinker and economist W. Brian Arthur sets forth a boldly original way of thinking about technology that gives answers to these questions. The Nature of Technology is an elegant and powerful theory of technology's origins and evolution. It achieves for the progress of technology what Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions did for scientific progress. Arthur explains how transformative new technologies arise and how innovation really works. Conventional thinking ascribes the invention of technologies to "thinking outside the box," or vaguely to genius or creativity, but Arthur shows that such explanations are inadequate. Rather, technologies are put together from pieces -- themselves technologies -- that already exist. Technologies therefore share common ancestries and combine, morph, and combine again to create further technologies. Technology evolves much as a coral reef builds itself from activities of small organisms -- it creates itself from itself; all technologies are descended from earlier technologies. Drawing on a wealth of examples, from historical inventions to the high-tech wonders of today, and writing in wonder fully engaging and clear prose, Arthur takes us on a mind-opening journey that will change the way we think about technology and how it structures our lives. (shrink)

We prove some results related to the problem of blowing up the power set of the least measurable cardinal. Our forcing results improve those of [1] by using the optimal hypothesis.

We show that the consistency of the theory “ZF + DC + Every successor cardinal is regular + Every limit cardinal is singular + Every successor cardinal satisfies the tree property” follows from the consistency of a proper class of supercompact cardinals. This extends earlier results due to the author showing that the consistency of the theory “\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\rm ZF} + \neg{\rm AC}_\omega}$$\end{document} + Every successor cardinal is regular + Every limit cardinal (...) is singular + Every successor cardinal satisfies the tree property” follows from hypotheses stronger in consistency strength than a supercompact limit of supercompact cardinals. A lower bound in consistency strength is provided by a result of Busche and Schindler, who showed that the consistency of the theory “ZF + Every successor cardinal is regular + Every limit cardinal is singular + Every successor cardinal satisfies the tree property” implies the consistency of ADL(R). (shrink)

We prove two theorems concerning indestructibility properties of the first two strongly compact cardinals when these cardinals are in addition the first two measurable cardinals. Starting from two supercompact cardinals $\kappa _1 < \kappa _2$, we force and construct a model in which $\kappa _1$ and $\kappa _2$ are both the first two strongly compact and first two measurable cardinals, $\kappa _1$ ’s strong compactness is fully indestructible, and $\kappa _2$ ’s strong compactness is indestructible under $\mathrm {Add}$ for any (...) ordinal $\delta $. This provides an answer to a strengthened version of a question of Sargsyan found in [17, Question 5]. We also investigate indestructibility properties that may occur when the first two strongly compact cardinals are not only the first two measurable cardinals, but also exhibit nontrivial degrees of supercompactness. (shrink)

For any ordinal δ, let λδ be the least inaccessible cardinal above δ. We force and construct a model in which the least supercompact cardinal κ is indestructible under κ-directed closed forcing and in which every measurable cardinal δ < κ is < λδ strongly compact and has its < λδ strong compactness indestructible under δ-directed closed forcing of rank less than λδ. In this model, κ is also the least strongly compact cardinal. We also establish versions of this result (...) in which κ is the least strongly compact cardinal but is not supercompact. (shrink)

Increasingly, medicine is used to remodel, revise, and revamp as much as to heal and mend. It is tempting to say that people make merely personal choices about these new uses. But such choices have implications for everybody, and they ought to be made cautiously, slowly, and in a way that opens them to discussion.